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2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
INTRODUCTION
In Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Texas, L.L.C., the en banc United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit unanimously held that Gilbert
Sanchez was not a seaman because he did not have an employment-related 
connection to a vessel that was substantial in nature.1 The United States 
Supreme Court created the nature requirement for seaman status in
Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis2 and discussed it further in Harbor Tug and Barge
Co. v. Papai.3 In Papai, Justice Kennedy said that a worker who did not
go to sea and who was not engaged in seagoing activity did not satisfy the
nature-of-the-work requirement.4 
Subsequently, in two cases, the Fifth Circuit did not interpret Papai’s
“going to sea” language literally but instead determined whether the nature
requirement was satisfied by asking whether the worker was exposed to
the perils of the sea.5 Unfortunately, in neither case did the court state
which perils of the sea the worker was exposed to or the extent of that
exposure.
In Sanchez, the Fifth Circuit reconsidered its prior jurisprudence in
light of the United States Supreme Court seaman-status jurisprudence and
held that a perils-of-the-sea analysis of the nature of a putative seaman’s
work alone is inadequate.6 While the court did not totally reject the
relevance of exposure to the perils of the sea, the court articulated three
additional inquires a court should take when considering the nature of the
work at issue: (1) does the worker owe allegiance to the vessel rather than
simply to a shore-based employer, (2) is the work sea-based, or does the
work involve seagoing activity, and (3) does the worker’s assignment
involve a discrete task, or does it include sailing or moving with the vessel
from location to location?7 
While seeking to bring clarity and consistency, I fear the Sanchez
expanded nature analysis may well bring confusion. Two of the
inquiries—allegiance and discrete task—overlap with the test for
determining whether a worker has an employment-related connection to a
vessel that is substantial in duration. One inquiry, allegiance, will have
1. Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Tex., L.L.C., 997 F.3d 566, 568 (5th Cir.
2021) (en banc).
2. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995).
3. Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548 (1997).
4. Id. 
5. In re Endeavor Marine, Inc., 234 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2000); Naquin v.
Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 2014).
6. Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 574 (en banc).
7. Id.
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32021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
little or no predictive value. Another inquiry, sea-based work, could
undermine the holding of McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander8 that
in order to qualify as a seaman the worker must merely be doing the work
of the vessel, not necessarily aiding in navigation. Courts should be wary
not to interpret sea-based work as aiding in navigation. And the sea-based-
work inquiry has substantive overlap with the perils-of-the-sea analysis.
Consequently, I would urge other circuits, state courts, and the United
States Supreme Court, when analyzing the nature requirement, to not use
the additional inquiries that the en banc Sanchez court articulated as strict
requisites to establishing seaman status but rather to analyze whether the
worker was exposed to the perils of the sea for 30% of the worker’s
employment on the relevant vessel. But, in doing so, courts should
articulate the perils of the sea in light of twenty-first century risks and
realities and should clearly and logically state the relevant perils of the sea, 
how the putative seaman was exposed to them, and the extent of that
exposure.
Part I will set out the facts of Sanchez and the pre-en banc proceedings.
Part II will discuss applicable Supreme Court jurisprudence. Part III will
provide several possible pre-Sanchez interpretations of that jurisprudence.
Part IV considers the Fifth Circuit’s pre-Sanchez nature jurisprudence. 
Part V describes the en banc court’s decision. Part VI unpacks the opinion,
and Part VII offers additional analysis.
I. SANCHEZ—FACTS AND THE PRE-EN BANC PROCEEDINGS
Gilbert Sanchez was a welder who suffered an injury when he tripped
on a pipe welded to a jack-up drilling rig.9 He sued his employer, Smart
Fabricators of Texas, L.L.C. (SmartFab), in state court claiming Jones Act
negligence.10 Sanchez spent 61 of the 67 days he had worked for the
defendant working on two different jack-up rigs.11 He worked on one of
the rigs, the Enterprise jack-up barge WFD 350 (WFD 350), for 48 days— 
72% of his total worktime with SmartFab.12 The entire time he worked on
the WFD 350, it was jacked up and level with the adjacent dock, from
which it was separated by only a gangplank, which Sanchez could traverse
in two steps.13 Sanchez never went to sea on the WFD 350.14 
8. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991).
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4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Sanchez also worked on the Enterprise jack-up barge 263 (E 263) for
13 days—19% of his time working for SmartFab.15 The E 263 was located
on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).16 Sanchez’s work on the E 263
involved making repairs so that the rig could begin drilling at a new site.17 
Indeed, Sanchez was aboard the rig when tugboats took it to the new
drilling site.18 Sanchez was injured on the E 263 when he fell.19 
One might have assumed the issue was simple enough: a jack-up rig 
is a vessel, Sanchez was doing the work of the vessel per Wilander,20 and
he spent more than 30% of his work time on the vessel, thus satisfying the
duration prong of the seaman-status test as required by Chandris.21 But
was his employment-related connection to the vessel substantial “in
nature”?22 While Sanchez did the work of the vessel and did so for well
over 30% of his work time, he did not regularly go to sea. Although he
was on a rig on the OCS for 19% of his employment with SmartFab, and
he was on that rig when it moved, this was the only relevant instance where
Sanchez was on a moving vessel. 
The defendant removed the case to federal court, and Sanchez sought
to have it remanded because Jones Act claims are not removable.23 The 
defendant argued that Sanchez was not a seaman, and the district court
agreed, holding Sanchez was not a seaman because he did not go to sea
and was not exposed to the perils of the sea.24 The Fifth Circuit initially 
affirmed in a panel opinion,25 but then the court superseded that decision
in a second panel opinion. In this 3–0 decision, the court, in an opinion by
Judge Davis, reversed the district court.26 
In the second Sanchez panel opinion, the court held that Sanchez was
doing the ship’s work and had an employment-related connection to the






20. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991).
21. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995).
22. See id. at 347; Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548 (1997).
23. Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 567 (en banc) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a)).
24. Sanchez v. Enter. Offshore Drilling, L.L.C., 376 F. Supp. 3d 726, 732
(S.D. Tex. 2019).
25. Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Tex., L.L.C., 952 F.3d 620 (5th Cir.
2020) (first panel opinion).
26. Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Tex., L.L.C., 970 F.3d 550 (5th Cir.
2020) (second panel opinion).
27. Id. at 555.
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  9 11/19/21  11:59 AM







   
    
 
    
 
   





    
 
  
   
 
  





   
   
   
   
   
 
   
      
    
      
   
    
   
52021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
the employment-related connection was substantial in nature even though
Sanchez did not go to sea, Judge Davis said, “Our case law rejects such a
narrow reading of the substantial-in-nature requirement.”28 He pointed to 
two Fifth Circuit decisions dealing with the nature requirement: In re
Endeavor Marine, Inc.29 and Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C.,30 which I
will discuss below. Interestingly, the primary focus of analysis in the
second Sanchez panel opinion was on Sanchez’s work on the WFD 350,
not the E 263. As Judge Davis wrote:
Although Sanchez’s injury occurred on the ENTERPRISE 263, 
the vast majority of his time with SmartFab was spent on the
ENTERPRISE WFD 350. Thus, it becomes critical whether his
work aboard that rig was substantial in terms of both its duration
and nature. For all 48 days he spent on the ENTERPRISE WFD
350, the rig was jacked up above water, a step away from and
adjacent to the shoreside pier. Sanchez only worked day shifts,
returning home every evening.31 
But, he was still, per the court, a seaman under Endeavor Marine and 
Naquin.32 That seemed to be that; but not so fast.
In addition to being the author of the second panel opinion in Sanchez, 
Judge Davis also separately concurred, and the other two members of the
panel—Judges Jones and Willett—joined him.33 In his concurrence, Judge
Davis—one of the most respected and accomplished admiralty jurists in
the Fifth Circuit, and arguably in all of the nation—said: “I am persuaded
that our case law is inconsistent with the teaching of the Supreme Court.
It is clear to me that Sanchez was a land-based fitter and welder whose
duties did not take him to sea; consequently, he does not qualify as a
seaman.”34 The judge pointed particularly to Papai and wrote, quoting
Justice Kennedy in part, as follows: “For the substantial connection
requirement to serve its purpose, the inquiry into the nature of the
employee’s connection to the vessel must concentrate on whether the
28. Id. at 554.
29. In re Endeavor Marine, Inc., 234 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2000).
30. Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 2014).
31. Sanchez, 970 F.3d at 552 (second panel opinion).
32. Id. at 555.
33. Id. (Davis, J., concurring).
34. Id. 
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  10 11/19/21  11:59 AM

















    
  
 
   
 
 
    
    








      
  
       
     
   
       
    
  
    
  
       
6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
employee’s duties take him to sea.”35 Such an inquiry, the Court explained,
is “helpful in distinguishing land-based from sea-based employees.”36 
The Supreme Court had noted that Papai’s “actual duty on the Pt.
Barrow [the relevant vessel] throughout the employment in question did
not include any seagoing activity; he was hired for one day to paint the
vessel at dockside and he was not going to sail with the vessel after he
finished painting it.”37 The Court concluded that no percentage of his work
“subject[ed] him to the perils of the sea.”38 After noting what the Supreme 
Court said in Papai, Judge Davis continued and said that Endeavor Marine
and Naquin had improperly applied United States Supreme Court
authority, which had serious implications for Gilbert Sanchez’s claims.39 
The defendant predictably moved for rehearing en banc. The Court
granted the motion, decided to set oral argument, and vacated the second
panel opinion.40 Argument en banc occurred on January 18, 2021, and on
May 11, 2021, the court issued its opinion, written by Judge Davis, finding
that Sanchez was not a seaman because his employment-related
connection to a vessel was not substantial in nature.41 But before
discussing the en banc opinion, let me review the relevant United States 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on seaman status, the Fifth Circuit’s prior
post-Papai application of the nature requirement, the interpretation of that
jurisprudence, and the potential pre-Sanchez possibilities.
II. APPLICABLE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SEAMAN-STATUS
JURISPRUDENCE
After years of silence, the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions
between 1991 and 1997, dealt with the requirements for seaman status,
trying to come up with a workable test “to separate the sea-based maritime
employees who are entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based
workers who have only a transitory or sporadic connection to a vessel in 
navigation.”42 
35. Id. at 556 (quoting Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 555
(1997)) (emphasis added).
36. Id. (Papai, 520 U.S. at 555).
37. Papai, 520 U.S. at 559.
38. Id.
39. Sanchez, 970 F.3d at 557 (Davis, J., concurring) (second panel opinion).
40. Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Tex., L.L.C., 978 F.3d 976 (5th Cir.
2020) (granting motion for rehearing en banc).
41. Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Tex., L.L.C., 997 F.3d 566 (5th Cir.
2021) (en banc).
42. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995).
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  11 11/19/21  11:59 AM





     
  
    
  







   
 
     
    
  
   
  
   
    
   
   
 
   
 
 
    
    
 
     
   
     
     
   
    
   
   
   
72021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
A. McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander
In Wilander, the Court held that in order to be a seaman, the worker
did not have to aid in navigation but had to be engaged in the ship’s work.43 
Thus, a paint foreman on a paint boat could qualify for seaman status.
Likewise, a bartender or manicurist on a cruise ship would be able to
qualify for seaman status, so long as they had an employment-related
connection to a vessel in navigation and performed the work of the
vessel.44 While sound in its logic and adherence to precedent—cooks and
others had long been recognized as seamen—the decision was also
consistent with lower court decisions recognizing that those who worked
on certain special-purpose vessels, such as in the oil and gas industry,
could be seamen. If the work of the vessel was oil and gas exploration and
extraction, then those engaged in that work might qualify as seamen.45 
B. Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni
After Wilander, the Court considered the issue of whether someone
whose job title was one of the jobs listed in the Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) was precluded from seaman
status. In Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, the plaintiff was a rigging 
foreman for Southwest Marine, a ship repair facility owner.46 The 
defendant owned several floating platforms and barges.47 Although Gizoni
was clearly a ship repairer (one of the covered job titles in the LHWCA),
he regularly worked on his employer’s platforms and rode on them when
they were being towed to a workplace.48 He often served as a lookout, gave
maneuvering signals, and handled lines to secure the platforms to vessels
needing repair.49 Gizoni suffered “disabling leg and back injuries in a fall
when his foot broke through a thin wooden sheet covering a hole in the
deck of a platform being used to transport a rudder from the shipyard to a
floating drydock.”50 He received LHWCA benefits and later sued to
recover for employer negligence under the Jones Act.51 
43. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 (1991).
44. Id.
45. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
46. Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81 (1991).
47. Id. at 83.
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8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Did the fact that Gizoni was a ship repairer, one of the job categories
listed in the LHWCA as maritime employment, mean that he was not a
seaman? In an opinion by Justice White, the Court said “no.” Even though
Gizoni was involved in ship repair, he could still be a “master or member
of the crew” of a vessel and thus be excluded from LHWCA coverage and
eligible for seaman’s benefits, including a Jones Act claim against his
employer.52 “Because a ship repairman may spend all of his working hours
aboard a vessel in furtherance of its mission—even one used exclusively
in ship repair work—that worker may qualify as a Jones Act seaman.”53 
Thus, once again, the connection to the vessel and doing the work of the
vessel, not job titles, were key. But what kind of connection to a vessel
was required?
C. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis
In Chandris, the Court provided guidance on what it meant to have an
employment connection to a vessel.54 Latsis was a marine engineer who 
suffered a detached retina, which was allegedly negligently treated by a
ship’s doctor.55 Latsis suffered the injury while on his employer’s vessel,
traveling to Bermuda in preparation for an upcoming renovation.56 Later,
he was with the ship while it was in drydock in Germany.57 Latsis’s
employer had a fleet of six ships.58 Latsis claimed he spent 72% of his
work time at sea; his employer said it was closer to 10%.59 The Court, in
analyzing the necessary connection to a vessel, generally followed Fifth
Circuit jurisprudence. It rejected a voyage test, under which anyone
working on a voyage on a ship on the high seas would qualify as a
seaman—a “blue water seaman.”60 
The Court held that in order to be a seaman, the worker had to have an
employment connection to a vessel or fleet of vessels under common
ownership and control that was substantial in duration and nature.61 The
52. Id. at 92.
53. Id.
54. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995).
55. Id. at 350–51.
56. Id. at 351.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 350.
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 363. The rejection of a voyage test prompted a concurrence from
Justice Stevens, which Justices Thomas and Breyer joined. Id. at 377 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
61. Id. at 365–66.
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  13 11/19/21  11:59 AM






    
  
    
  
   
   
  
      
 
 





   
  
 















   
 
     
     
   
92021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
Court said that a workable guideline for determining the duration of a
putative seaman’s employment-related connection to a vessel or fleet of
vessels under common ownership or control was that the worker spend at
least 30% of his time aboard a ship.62 Furthermore, the Court, in reviewing
the jury instructions and the Second Circuit’s opinion, made clear that the
employment-related connection to a vessel must be substantial in both
duration and nature: “The worker’s duties must contribute to the function
of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, and the worker must
have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or an identifiable group of
vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.”63 
But what does a connection of a substantial “nature” mean? 
The fundamental purpose of this substantial connection
requirement is to give full effect to the remedial scheme created
by Congress and to separate the sea-based maritime employees
who are entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based
workers who have only a transitory or sporadic connection to a
vessel in navigation, and therefore whose employment does not
regularly expose them to the perils of the sea.64 
Thus, exposure to the perils of the sea was critical. Continuing, the Court
said:
In defining the prerequisites for Jones Act coverage, we think it
preferable to focus upon the essence of what it means to be a
seaman and to eschew the temptation to create detailed tests to
effectuate the congressional purpose, tests that tend to become
ends in and of themselves. The principal formulations employed
by the Courts of Appeals—“more or less permanent assignment”
or “connection to a vessel that is substantial in terms of its duration
and nature”—are simply different ways of getting at the same
basic point: The Jones Act remedy is reserved for sea-based
maritime employees whose work regularly exposes them to “the
special hazards and disadvantages to which they who go down to
sea in ships are subjected.” Indeed, it is difficult to discern major
substantive differences in the language of the two phrases. In our
view, “the total circumstances of an individual’s employment
must be weighed to determine whether he had a sufficient relation
to the navigation of vessels and the perils attendant thereon.” The
62. Id. at 367, 371.
63. Id. at 376, 368.
64. Id.
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  14 11/19/21  11:59 AM










    
 
  
   
 
    
   
 
    
 
       
    
    
    
 
 












     








10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
duration of a worker’s connection to a vessel and the nature of the
worker's activities, taken together, determine whether a maritime
employee is a seaman because the ultimate inquiry is whether the
worker in question is a member of the vessel’s crew or simply a
land-based employee who happens to be working on the vessel at
a given time.65 
Clearly then, exposure to the perils of the sea was a crucial part of what it
meant to have an employment-related connection to a vessel that was 
substantial in nature. The phrase is evocative.66 
Returning to Chandris itself, it is important to note that while the 
Court largely adopted the Fifth Circuit’s approach to seaman status from
Offshore Co. v. Robison,67 the addition of the “and nature” requirement
was not from Robison. The Robison formulation of the seaman-status test
focused on the duration of the putative seaman’s relationship with the
vessel or fleet of vessels, not the nature of the work.68 
65. Id. at 369–70 (first quoting Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S.
85, 104 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting); then quoting Wallace v. Oceaneering
Int’l, 727 F.2d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 1984)).
66. As Professor David W. Robertson wrote years before the Court decided
Chandris:
Exposure to the ‘perils of the sea’ and to risks attending the movement
of vessels on navigable water are the distinguishing characteristics of a
seaman’s work. ‘Perils of the sea’ is what the poet (and lawyer) Wallace 
Stevens might have called an inherently poetic idea; it resonates with
meaning that exceeds our definitional and expository capabilities. We
know what is meant by perils of the sea, even though we cannot expect
to enumerate all of the possible instances or subcategories. But any list
would certainly include the full range of dangers associated with deep
water, wind and weather, tides and currents, ocean predators, great
distances from shore, relative isolation, and inaccessibility of shore-side 
facilities for aid and succor.
David W. Robertson, A New Approach to Determining Seaman Status, 64 TEX. L.
REV. 79, 80 (1985) [hereinafter Robertson, New Approach].
67. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
68. As the Robison court said:
[T]here is an evidentiary basis for a Jones Act case to go to the jury: (1) if 
there is evidence that the injured workman was assigned permanently to
a vessel (including special purpose structures not usually employed as a
means of transport by water but designed to float on water) or performed
a substantial part of his work on the vessel; and (2) if the capacity in
which he was employed or the duties which he performed contributed to
the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, or to
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  15 11/19/21  11:59 AM






     
   
 
    
 
  
       
    
 
  
   
    




      
   
  
    




   
 
  
     
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
112021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
Chandris not only added the nature requirement, but the Court made
sure that the employment-related connection to a vessel was substantial in
duration and nature, not duration or nature.69 The Second Circuit had
stated it both ways in its opinion in Chandris, but the Supreme Court
clearly made duration and nature conjunctive.70 
The Court in Chandris emphasized that the connection is to a vessel
or fleet of vessels under common ownership or control.71 The relationship 
has a temporal element—duration of 30%—and substantive elements— 
doing the work of the vessel and substantiality in nature.72 To this humble 
reader, the vaguest aspect of the test after Chandris was what it took to
have a substantial relationship in nature. It definitely related to being
exposed to the perils of the sea, but exactly how did the worker have to be
exposed to the perils? And, for how long? 
D. Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai
The next and most recent seaman-status decision from the Supreme
Court was Papai. Papai got his jobs each day through the Inland
Boatman’s Union hiring hall in San Francisco.73 He had been doing so for
more than two years before the day of his injury.74 His work through the 
hiring hall consisted of maintenance, longshoring, and deckhand work.75 
Most of his assignments were for 3 days or less; the longest was for 40
days.76 Papai claimed that most of his assignments involved deckhand 
work.77 Before the day of his injury, he had worked for Harbor Tug &
Barge 12 times over two and a half weeks.78 On the day of the injury, Papai
was hired for that one day only to paint; it was not anticipated that he
would sail with the ship, and he did not do so.79 He injured his knee when
the ladder on which he was working moved and he fell.80 Papai sued,
the operation or welfare of the vessel in terms of its maintenance during
its movement or during anchorage for its future trips.
Id. at 779.
69. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 370–71.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 368.
72. Id. at 367.
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12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
claiming that he was a seaman and that the employer was negligent.81 The 
district court held Papai was not a seaman.82 The Ninth Circuit reversed
and remanded, concluding that if the work Papai did through the hiring
hall would have made him a seaman if he had done it all for one employer, 
then there was a jury question on seaman status.83 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the seaman-status
issue, and, in the introductory section of his opinion, Justice Kennedy said:
On the question of seaman status, there is an issue of significance
beyond the facts of this case. Our statement in an earlier case that
a worker may establish seaman status based on the substantiality
of his connection to “an identifiable group of . . . vessels” in
navigation . . . has been subject to differing interpretations, and we
seek to provide clarification.84 
Thus, one would think that the issue before the Court was what
constituted an identifiable group of vessels, i.e., a fleet. Did it require
common ownership and control? Or would it include all the vessels that
hired out of the hiring hall?
The Court held that there was no indication the vessels and vessel
owners using the hiring hall “were subject to unitary ownership or control
in any aspect of their business or operation.”85 Each was free to hire as it
chose.86 The requisite link for common ownership and control was not
established by the mere use of the same hiring hall that drew from the same
pool of employees.87 
Of greater current importance, when discussing the basic issue of
seaman status, the Court discussed the nature of the employment.88 Justice
Kennedy wrote:
For the substantial connection requirement to serve its purpose,
the inquiry into the nature of the employee’s connection to the
vessel must concentrate on whether the employee’s duties take
him to sea. This will give substance to the inquiry both as to the
duration and nature of the employee’s connection to the vessel and
be helpful in distinguishing land-based from sea-based
81. Id. at 551–52.
82. Id. at 552.
83. Id. at 552–53.
84. Id. at 550–51 (citing Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995)).
85. Id. at 557.
86. Id. 
87. Id.
88. Id. at 555.
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132021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
employees.89 
This is a somewhat curious statement, subtle perhaps to the point of
ambiguity. What did it mean? This is the section of the Papai opinion
Judge Davis quoted in his concurrence in the second panel opinion in
Sanchez.90 
Back to Papai; Justice Kennedy continued:
This is not a case where the employee was hired to perform
seagoing work during the employment in question, however brief,
and we need not consider here the consequences of such an
employment. The IBU Deckhands Agreement gives no reason to 
assume that any particular percentage of Papai’s work would be
of a seagoing nature, subjecting him to the perils of the sea. In
these circumstances, the union agreement does not advance the 
accuracy of the seaman-status inquiry. . . . Jones Act coverage is
confined to seamen, those workers who face regular exposure to
the perils of the sea.91 
So Papai reiterated the common-ownership-and-control requirement
regarding fleets. The Court also indicated that, under the facts, the
relationship or connection to a vessel for analysis is the particular
employment relationship between the putative seaman and the employer
defendant.92 While Chandris discussed the worker’s entire employment
history, Papai limited the analysis to the entire employment history with
the particular employer involved.93 And, in ignoring the time Papai had
worked for Harbor Tug before the day in question, it became clear that
each discrete employment engagement guided the status determination.
Thus, Papai’s entire employment history with Harbor Tug, for purposes of
the case, was one day.94 During that day, he would not be engaged in any
seagoing activity; he would not go to sea; accordingly, per the Court, he
89. Id.
90. Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Tex., L.L.C., 970 F.3d 550, 556 (5th Cir.
2020) (Davis, J., concurring) (second panel opinion).
91. Papai, 520 U.S. at 559. The reader will note Justice Kennedy’s express
reference to the perils of the sea.
92. Id. at 559–60.
93. Id. 
94. Id.
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14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
would not be exposed to the perils of the sea.95 Thus, his relationship to 
the employer’s vessel was not substantial in nature.96 
III. POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS
There were several possible interpretations of the nature requirement
and the “going to sea” language under the Supreme Court’s 1990s seaman
jurisprudence. First, the Supreme Court could have meant “take him to
sea” to literally mean go to sea! That is, in order to be a seaman, a person
must have literally gone out on vessels on the sea! Of course, that would
mean that brown-water seamen and those working on the nation’s inland
navigable waterways could not be seamen. That reading would overturn a
significant body of jurisprudence. As the Fifth Circuit noted in Naquin v.
Elevating Boats, L.L.C.:
[W]e have dozens of cases finding oilfield workers and other
‘brown-water’ workers on drilling barges and other vessels
qualified as seamen even though they spent all their work time on
these vessels submerged in quiet inland canals and waterways.97 
One cannot assume that the Supreme Court meant to make such a sea
change (pardon the pun). One could also read “take him to sea” as meaning
going to sea or onto the navigable waters of the United States. This reading 
is more consistent with the way the jurisprudence on seaman status
developed nationwide and in the Fifth Circuit. And of course a person on
inland navigable waters is exposed to the perils of work in a maritime
setting—more on that later.98 
Alternatively, the idea that the employment-related connection to a
vessel must be substantial in nature could have related to the type of work
being done. That is, the person must have done traditional seaman’s work
95. Id. 
96. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented. Id. at 
560 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927, 935 (5th Cir. 2014).
98. See David W. Robertson, The Supreme Court’s Approach to Determining
Seaman Status Discerning the Law Amid Loose Language and Catchphrases, 34 
J. MAR. L. & COMM. 547, 568–69 (2003) [hereinafter Robertson, Discerning]
(“One cannot sensibly study the Supreme Court’s seaman status jurisprudence
without knowing this: Throughout its four post-Robison seaman status opinions,
the Court consistently uses the word ‘sea’ to include all navigable water. When
the justices want to refer to the actual ocean, they say ‘open sea’ or ‘high seas.’”)
(first quoting Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 351 (1995); then quoting
Papai, 520 U.S. at 559).
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152021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
in order to have a connection that was substantial in nature. The problem
with this reading is that it is too much like the aid-to-navigation
requirement that the Court rejected in Wilander. There, the Court adopted
Fifth Circuit jurisprudence and held that the worker’s job must further the
mission of the vessel and need not aid in navigation. Thus, a job like a
bartender on a cruise ship would further the vessel’s mission even though
a person on the street would not think of bartending as seafaring work— 
unless perhaps they were not on the street but on a cruise ship!
Alternatively, the nature requirement could have been read as a worker
merely having a sufficiently real connection to a vessel or fleet of vessels
under common ownership and control. That is, once one had a sufficient
temporal relationship to the vessel and furthered the mission of the vessel,
there was a sufficient connection. The late Professor Robertson referred to
this as a “vessel connection” test.99 There is some administrative
convenience to such a duration/vessel-mission test. It arguably gets the
right answer in the vast number of cases and then avoids the messiness of
having to make individual, case-specific determinations about the nature
of the seaman’s work. Under such a pure duration test, Sanchez would 
have been a seaman. But under a pure duration test, the nature requirement
would be meaningless. If anyone who satisfied the durational requirement
and contributed to the function of the vessel was a seaman, then the nature
requirement would add nothing. But if that were the case, then why did the
Chandris court insist that to be a seaman, the employment-related
connection had to be substantial in duration and nature? Nature must mean
something.
Returning to first principles, why are seamen afforded special rights?
Why are they “wards of the admiralty”?100 The historic answer was
because seamen faced special risks. What are those special risks? Those
associated with the perils of the sea. It thus becomes critical to define the
perils of the sea: storms; for the blue-water seaman, distance from home;
isolation; dangers inherent in being on or subject to moving vessels; and
more. Indeed, one can argue that the just listed perils either arose out of,
or were augmented by or related to, the motion of vessels. Storms at sea
are particularly dangerous to moving vessels, which can be buoyed about
by the wind and the waves. Loneliness and distance from resources and
support arise out of the fact that a vessel has traveled away from its home
99. Robertson, New Approach, supra note 66, at 97. For another insightful
analysis of seaman-status jurisprudence, including the decisions discussed herein,
see Kenneth G. Engerrand, Escape from the Labyrinth: Call for the Admiralty 
Judges of the Supreme Court to Reconsider Seaman Status, 40 HOUS. J. INT’L L.
741 (2018).
100. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 246 (1942).
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16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
port.101 Whatever the complete articulation of the perils of the sea include,
seamen receive special treatment, in part, because they are exposed to the
perils of the sea.102 
As Professor Robertson put it:
In its post-Wilander seaman status cases, the Court has
consistently used the phrase “perils of the sea” as a term of art to
embrace both perils of the open ocean and vessel-movement
dangers. There is really no reasoned dispute about the core policy:
seamen face special dangers—including deep-sea and open-ocean 
perils as well as vessel-movement dangers on inland waterways— 
that demand special protections.103 
101. Of course, a seaman is still a seaman if injured when the vessel to which
the worker is assigned is not moving.
102. A worker on an offshore platform is subject to some perils of the sea— 
storms, isolation, being injured by a moving vessel that allides with the
platform—but the platform worker lacks the connection to a vessel.
103. Robertson, Discerning, supra note 98, at 570 (citations omitted). In an
earlier piece, Robertson wrote more extensively on the perils of the sea. In
Robertson, New Approach, supra note 66, at 80–81, 82, 84, he wrote:
The sea is obviously a high-risk workplace. So is a vessel in motion on
navigable water, even though it may be within sight and hailing distance
of land. Vessels in active operation are complex industrial enterprises 
presenting a range of hazards that differ significantly from those incident
to work on land, piers, drydocks, and even vessels that are temporarily
out of active marine operation while securely moored or anchored in
protected inland water. A worker whose duties frequently take him
aboard moving vessels, or who is otherwise significantly exposed to risks
generated by moving vessels, confronts seamen’s dangers. Like the 
perils of the sea, the risks attending the movement of vessels on
navigable water are also distinguishing characteristics of the seaman’s 
work environment.
For the affected workers, these characteristic seamen’s hazards are
psychological as well as physical risk factors. In any employment
setting, workers cause most of the accidents. ‘Stress and its companion
symptoms . . . fatigue, frustration, [and] anxiety . . . erode the
watchfulness and alertness that are required to keep a high risk operation
working effectively, efficiently, safely, and profitably.’ Seamen work in
a distinctive high risk environment that contributes to such stresses.
. . .
The seamen’s remedies should be available to all workers who undergo
significant exposure to the characteristic seamen’s dangers. However,
these remedies are not designed to benefit every worker who comes into
contact with vessels or sometimes goes on the water. When the duties of
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  21 11/19/21  11:59 AM






     
  
   
  








   
 
    
   
  
   
   
 
  
   










   




      
      
172021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
Of course, under the Supreme Court jurisprudence, a worker on a
moored vessel might not have achieved seaman status if the worker was 
not exposed to the perils of the sea. After all, the perils of the sea arise
significantly out of working on a vessel that is moving or could move. But
critically, this did not mean that a person was not a seaman if injured when
the vessel on which one worked was not moving. That would be a
snapshot-status test, which the Supreme Court rejected in Chandris. It
would also be inconsistent with Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co., 
wherein the Court held that an instrumentality did not have to be in transit
at the moment of the relevant events to be a vessel.104 But this reading of
the jurisprudence would have meant that the worker must be exposed to
the perils of the sea—those arising from the motive power of vessels on
water—for some portion of their employment in order to satisfy the nature
requirement. How long? I would argue that logic should gauge the
duration and nature requirements with the same temporal measuring rod.
That is, in order to satisfy the nature requirement, the worker would have
had to be exposed to the perils of the sea for 30% of their time with the
vessel. Thirty percent both matches the durational requirement and would
be simple for juries to apply. 
Now, would a 30% nature requirement have required that the worker
be on a moving vessel for 30% of the worker’s employment with the
employer? Not necessarily. But how can that be? As Professor Robertson
noted, the perils of the sea include being “significantly exposed to risks
generated by moving vessels.”105 Thus, the worker on a vessel that was not
in motion may still have been exposed to the perils of the sea because the
worker was subject to risks posed by other moving vessels. The longshore
worker on a dock or the platform worker are subject to risks posed by 
ship repairmen, longshoremen, and similarly situated inshore workers
take them aboard a vessel, the ship is typically out of the water or at rest
in calm inland water, securely moored or anchored. Such amphibious
inshore workers, who do not confront the perils of the sea and who are
seldom involved with vessel movement, face significant work-place
hazards, but they are not subjected to the same physical and
psychological risks that characterize the seaman’s environment.
. . .
The governmental policy at stake in the seaman status jurisprudence is
assuring the protection of the benevolent seamen’s remedies to those 
workers who confront the characteristic seamen’s dangers, while 
confining other maritime and amphibious workers to alternative 
remedial systems.
104. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 495 (2005).
105. Robertson, New Approach, supra note 66, at 80.
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18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
vessels on adjacent waters. But the longshore worker on a dock and the
platform worker are not on vessels. Interestingly, a platform worker
injured as result of an allision of a vessel with a dock or platform on which
the worker is employed can sue the vessel in admiralty under the
Admiralty Extension Act.106 Thus, while longshoreman and platform
workers are not seamen, those workers still get some of the benefits of
admiralty.
Accordingly, in order to be a seaman under my proposed reading of
the Supreme Court’s 1990s jurisprudence—before Sanchez—a worker 
would have had to: (1) do the work of the vessel and (2) have an
employment-related connection to a vessel or fleet of vessels under
common ownership and control that was substantial in (a) duration and (b)
nature. To be substantial in duration, the worker would have had to spend
about 30% or more of his work time with the relevant vessel or fleet of
vessels, absent reassignment. To be substantial in nature, the worker would
have had to be exposed to the perils of the sea for about 30% or more of
his employment with the relevant employer. And the perils of the sea,
whatever else they include, also arise out of the dangers associated with
vessels in motion.
That was the Galligan reading before Sanchez.
IV. THE NATURE OF THE BEAST IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT AND 
LOUISIANA—SELECTED DECISIONS
But what did the lower courts do with the nature requirement and
Papai’s “going to sea” language?107 Notably, what did the Fifth Circuit
do? The Fifth Circuit first considered the question in Endeavor Marine,
Inc.108 Kevin Baye was a crane operator who worked on a derrick barge,
the FRANK L.109 Normally, he did not board the barge until it was moored
106. 46 U.S.C. § 30101.
107. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Buchanan Marine, L.P., 874 F.3d 356 (2d
Cir. 2017) (plaintiff was not a seaman; he did not engage in sea-based activities,
never operated a vessel, and worked on barges only when secured to the dock);
Cabral v. Healy Tibbits Builders, Inc., 128 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1997) (barge crane
operator assigned to the barge for a specific project was not a seaman); Delange
v. Dutra Const. Co., Inc., 183 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 1999) (reasonable juror could
find that a “carpenter” was a seaman when his work involved crewman and
deckhand duties). These cases are cited in the en banc Sanchez opinion. 997 F.3d
564 (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc).
108. In re Endeavor Marine, Inc., 234 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2000).
109. Id. at 289.
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192021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
or about to be moored.110 He was injured while helping moor the barge to 
a vessel in the Mississippi River, waiting to pass a mooring line to deck
hands aboard the vessel.111 Then, the stern mooring cable of a nearby 
derrick barge snagged on the hull of the FRANK L; the line snapped and 
popped up onto the deck, striking Baye in the leg.112 Baye sued his
employer, claiming he was a seaman.113 The district court held that Baye
was not a seaman because, under the language in Papai, the “linchpin” for
seaman status was whether the worker’s duties carried him to sea, and 
Baye did not go to sea.114 
The court reversed in a per curiam opinion, noting that the inquiry
under Chandris was status-based.115 The key was the connection to a 
vessel or fleet of vessels.116 But what about the nature requirement? What
about not taking the worker to sea? The court held that the Supreme Court
in Papai did not intend to make going to sea the “singular rule for
determining seaman status.”117 The court stated that Justice Kennedy had 
noted that going to sea was “helpful” in determining seaman status.118 The
reader infers that to the court, being “helpful” did not mean required. The 
Fifth Circuit also said:
[W]hen read in context, the “going to sea” passage in [Papai] is a 
shorthand way of saying that the employee’s connection to the 
vessel regularly exposes him “‘to the perils of the sea.’” In other
words, we do not think that the [Papai] Court intended to
articulate a new and specific test for seaman status.119 
So in Endeavor Marine, going to sea was not a critical, required
element. Rather the key was exposure to the perils of the sea. But what are 
those perils, and was Baye exposed to them? The court did not explain
why Baye was exposed to the perils of the sea, to what perils he was
exposed, or how he was so exposed, although it concluded that he was in





114. Id. at 290.




119. Id. (citing Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 554–55 
(1997)).
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20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
The Fifth Circuit revisited the question of “going to sea” in Naquin v.
Elevating Boats, L.L.C.120 Naquin worked for Elevating Boats, L.L.C.
(EBI) at a vessel repair facility at defendant’s shipyard.121 EBI maintained 
a fleet of specialty-lift boats and marine cranes.122 Naquin maintained and
repaired the lift-boats.123 Naquin usually worked on the vessels when they
were moored, jacked up, or docked.124 He spent 70% of his work time on
the vessels.125 Two to three times per week, he would do his work while 
the vessel was moving, and he would go on test runs.126 He was injured
when he was operating a crane, the crane collapsed, and he jumped from
the crane house.127 He sued under the Jones Act, claiming that he was a 
seaman and that his employer was negligent.128 The jury found that Naquin 
was a seaman and awarded damages.129 The Fifth Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Davis, affirmed.130 
The court considered whether Naquin had the requisite employment-
related connection to a vessel that was substantial in duration and nature.131 
The court noted that ship repair was classic seaman’s work, but EBI argued
that Naquin’s duties did not regularly expose him to the perils of the sea.132 
To support its contention, EBI pointed out that Naquin did not sleep on the
vessels; he usually worked on them when they were docked; and he almost
never was on the vessels on the sea, as opposed to the canal area where he
was injured.133 The court was not swayed. Judge Davis said: “[C]ourts
have consistently rejected the categorical assertion that workers who 
spend their time aboard vessels near the shore do not face maritime perils.
While these near-shore workers may face fewer risks, they still remain
exposed to the perils of a maritime work environment.”134 
The court discussed Endeavor Marine and saw no reason to deviate 
from its reasoning, concluding that Naquin’s connection to the vessels he
120. Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 2014).






127. Id. at 931.
128. Id. 
129. Id.
130. Id. at 930.
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212021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
repaired was substantial in nature.135 Once again, it was not explicit which
perils of the sea threatened Naquin. Thus, the stage was set for Sanchez.
135. Id. at 935. In between Endeavor Marine and Naquin, the Louisiana
Supreme Court decided Richard v. Mike Hooks, Inc., 799 So. 2d 462 (La. 2001).
Richard worked for Mike Hooks, Inc. as a tacker and welder’s helper. He worked
at a dockside yard that was used to repair defendant’s vessels, which it used in its
dredging operations.
Richard’s duties included picking up scrap iron, unhooking pipe, loading
barges, and fabricating items to be used on the vessels. In addition,
Richard spent in excess of thirty percent of his time performing direct 
repair and maintenance to Hooks’s vessels including changing out decks,
replacing pipes, changing out cables, replacing mufflers and,
occasionally, repairing engines.
The vessels that Richard worked aboard were dockside, he was never
more than a gangplank’s distance from shore while working, and some 
of the vessels being repaired were partially on land. Richard was not
hired as part of the dredging crew that performed repairs on vessels 
during the dredging operations. He did not eat or sleep on defendant’s
vessels, nor did he keep watch over them. Richard never worked aboard
any dredge during its primary operations, nor did he work on any dredge
being moved over navigable water in pursuit of its mission. Richard’s
only time spent on a moving vessel was once every month or so when he
was required to ride in a small boat to assist in moving dredge pipe along
a canal adjacent to Hooks’s yard. This latter assignment lasted, on
average, about forty-five minutes to two hours in duration.
Id. at 464.
He was injured while working on land, unloading pipe from a truck when the
boom of a crane fell on his right arm. He sued, claiming he was a seaman and
entitled to recover under the Jones Act. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Calogero, first found that Richard’s work contributed to
the mission of the vessel. Id. at 466. Turning to the substantial-employment-
relationship requirement, the court of appeal had concluded that Richard’s work
was “of a seagoing nature that exposed him to the perils of the sea.” Id. Richard’s
expert had stated that Richard faced the perils of the sea because he faced “hazards
of cargo operations, ship’s cranes/booms, slippery decks, sinking vessel, fire 
hazards, etc.” Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed. While Richard spent
30% of his time working on vessels and may have been exposed to some perils,
that “does not automatically qualify him as a seaman.” Id. The Chief noted:
all of the vessels on which plaintiff worked were dockside; he was never
more than a gangplank’s distance from shore when working on the 
vessels; some of the vessels were partially on land while being repaired;
he never slept on the vessels; he did not eat on the vessels; he did not 
keep watch on vessels overnight; he was not a member of Hooks’s
dredge crew that performed welding on dredges in operation; he never
worked on a vessel while it was performing its primary mission; he took
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  26 11/19/21  11:59 AM




   





   
 
 
   
  
 
    
       
   
   
 
     
 
   
      
   
    









     
  
    
  
    
  
   
    
   
   
22 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
V. SANCHEZ EN BANC
The facts of Sanchez are set forth in Part I, so I will proceed straight
to the en banc decision. The court, in an opinion by Judge Davis, re-
examined its jurisprudence, reversed the panel opinion holding that
Sanchez was a seaman, and attempted to provide clarity for how one
should determine whether a putative seaman’s connection to a vessel was
substantial in nature.136 In doing so it rejected exposure to the perils of the
sea as the sole or primary test to determine nature. 
After reviewing the decisions below and the Supreme Court’s 1990s
seaman jurisprudence, the court turned to Naquin and Endeavor Marine, 
in that order. The court summarily overruled Naquin in one paragraph
because all of the plaintiff’s work was performed “on or near the dock, and
we erred in analyzing [the case] . . . based solely on the ‘perils of the sea’
test . . . .”137 Turning to Endeavor Marine, the court said that it could not
say that the plaintiff was not a seaman because he was permanently
assigned to the same barge; the barge moved, and plaintiff moved with the
barge.138 But the Sanchez court did not endorse the reasoning of the 
Endeavor Marine court because it relied on the “perils of the sea” as its
primary test for determining the nature of the employment connection to a
vessel.139 In reference to Naquin, Endeavor Marine, and the “perils of the 
sea” test, the court said that while the perils of the sea “is one of the
considerations in the calculus, it is not the sole or even the primary test.”140 
In the next section of its opinion, the court articulated the “following
additional inquiries” relevant to the nature decision:
his orders from a land-based foreman; he was only aboard small moving
vessels once every month, for short durations, where he assisted in
moving dredge pipe along a canal adjacent to Hooks’s yard; and his
repair duties did not take him to sea. While none of these individual facts
alone prohibit an employee from attaining seaman status, a consideration
of them together shows that Richard was a land-based employee, not a
seaman.
Id. at 467. See also Gage v. Canal Barge Co., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 3d 754, 770 (M.D.
La. 2020) (relying on Naquin and noting that “the perils of a maritime work
environment” or “maritime perils” may more accurately capture the nature
requirement than “perils of the sea”).
136. Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Tex., L.L.C., 997 F.3d 566 (5th Cir.
2021) (en banc).




360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  27 11/19/21  11:59 AM






   
    
    
   
   
 
   
     
  
   
   
  
     
   
   
    
  
  
   
   
   
  
   
 
  





   
   
     
    
   
       
     
   
   
   
232021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
(1) Does the worker owe his allegiance to the vessel, rather than
simply to a shoreside employer?
(2) Is the work sea-based or [does it] involve seagoing activity?
(3) (a) Is the worker’s assignment to a vessel limited to
performance of a discrete task after which the worker’s connection
to the vessel ends, or (b) Does the worker’s assignment include
sailing with the vessel from port to port or location to location? 141 
The court referred to these as “more definitive inquiries set forth by
the Supreme Court.”142 The first question comes from language in
Wilander and Chandris.143 The second is clearly derived from Papai’s
“going to sea” and “seagoing activity” language.144 The third also seems
to be derived from Papai, in which Justice Kennedy referred to the
putative seaman’s “discrete engagements” that were “transitory or
sporadic” connections to a vessel.145 It also emanates from Chandris where 
the Court referred to a “transitory or sporadic” connection to a vessel and
to a “land-based worker who happens to be working on the vessel at a
given time.”146 After setting forth the additional inquiries, the court
reiterated that “[s]imply asking whether the worker was subject to the
‘perils of the sea’ is not enough to resolve the nature element.”147 
The court then considered the facts before it. It said that Sanchez was
doing the work of the vessel; thus, he satisfied Wilander.148 He also had an
employment-related connection to a vessel or fleet of vessels that was 
substantial in duration since he spent more than 90% of his employment
with SmartFab working on jack-up rigs, which are vessels.149 Therefore, 
the “question narrow[ed] to determine whether Sanchez spent at least 30
percent of his time aboard these two vessels doing work that satisfies the
nature prong of that test.”150 Clearly, Judge Davis tied the nature
requirement to the 30% duration requirement, which is consistent with the
possible reading of Supreme Court jurisprudence I outlined above.
Judge Davis then turned to answering the narrowed question, and he
broke the analysis down into two parts: Sanchez’s work on the WFD 350
141. Id. at 574.
142. Id.
143. Id. at n.65.
144. Id. at 571–72.
145. Id. at 572.
146. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368, 370 (1995).
147. Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 574 (en banc).
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 575.
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24 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
and his work on the E 263. The reader will recall that 72% of Sanchez’s 
work with SmartFab was on the WFD 350. The court said that the work
on the WFD 350 was not “sea-based” and did not involve any “seagoing
activity” as per Papai.151 Sanchez did not go to sea with the WFD 350, and 
he was not going to sail with the vessel after he finished his work.152 The
Sanchez court drew the appropriate parallels between Papai and Sanchez’s
work on the WFD 350. Thus, while it did not expressly say so, it is
apparent that Sanchez’s work on the WFD 350 did not satisfy the second
of the articulated guidelines—that the work was sea-based or involved
seagoing activity.
The court then analyzed Sanchez’s work on the E 263. The E 263 was
located on the OCS and was moved while Sanchez was on it.153 Sanchez 
spent 19% of his employment time with SmartFab on the E263.154 
Critically, one might conclude that any analysis of Sanchez’s work on the
E 263 was unnecessary since, even if he established that the nature of his
work on the E 263 was sea-based, it was only 19% of his work, and he
could not establish seaman status at 19% under the holding of Chandris, 
which as noted, required that a worker spend 30% of his time working on
the relevant vessels.155 If that is the case, then, arguably, anything said
about the work on the E 263 is unnecessary to the decision and dictum. 
But the court did discuss Sanchez’s work on the E 263, and it would be
reckless to ignore what an en banc court said based on fine points of what
is and what is not dictum.
Judge Davis indicated that Sanchez’s work on the E 263 involved
“discrete repairs . . . for a specific reason”: to prepare the rig to be able to
drill at its new location.156 There was no evidence Sanchez would remain
on the E 263 after the crew completed their repair work.157 Even though
located on the OCS, and arguably satisfying the sea-based-work second
additional inquiry, Sanchez’s work on the E 263 was a “discrete,
individual job.”158 When the job was over, Sanchez would have no further
connection with the vessel. Thus, while not clearly tied to the first and
third additional nature inquiries, the analysis seems to say that Sanchez did
not have a sufficient allegiance to the E 263—the first additional inquiry— 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 576.
154. Id.
155. The reader will recall that the second panel opinion focused on the work
on the WFD 350. See supra text accompanying note 31.
156. Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 575 (en banc).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 576.
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252021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
and the job was a discrete assignment—the third additional inquiry. The
importance of the third inquiry seems more critical to me than the first,
which is really only inferred. 
Interestingly, as to workers on rigs in general, the court said:
Our case law reveals generally that two types of workers are found
on drilling rigs. First, we have the drilling crew, who conduct the
drilling operations (and workers who support that activity) and
stay with the vessel when it moves from one drilling location to
another. These workers are the members of the crew of the vessel
and are seamen. The second group are specialized transient
workers, usually employed by contractors. These workers are
engaged to do specific discrete short-term jobs. Discrete transient
jobs are like the work done by longshoremen when a vessel calls
in port. As stated in Papai, these workers have only a “transitory
or sporadic” connection to a vessel or group of vessels and do not
qualify for seaman status. Sanchez, as a transitory worker, falls
into the second group, and thus does not satisfy the nature test.159 
Thus, Judge Davis drew a distinction between the oil rig worker who
stayed with the vessel and the worker whose job was transient. As Judge
Davis said in the second paragraph of the opinion, Sanchez’s relevant
work was “two discrete short-term transient repair jobs on two vessels,”
and he was not engaged in sea-based work.160 Thus Sanchez did not satisfy
the nature requirement and was not a seaman. The en banc Sanchez
decision was unanimous, with Judge Dennis concurring and encouraging
courts in “more challenging” cases to consult Professor Robertson’s
work.161 
VI. SANCHEZ UNPACKED
In the years since the Supreme Court decided Chandris and Papai,
there has been understandable confusion concerning what it means to
require a putative seaman to have an employment-related connection to a
vessel in navigation that is substantial in nature. The Chandris Court
adopted the nature requirement but did not define it, although it did refer
to the special risks that seamen face—the perils of the sea. While there
was not clarity after Chandris, there was also not confusion. After Papai,
159. Id. (citing Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 559–60 
(1997)).
160. Id. at 566.
161. Id. at 576 (Dennis, J., concurring).
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26 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
if there was not outright confusion, there was greater uncertainty arising
out of Justice Kennedy’s “take him to sea” language and his references to
sea-based and seagoing activities. Post-Papai, did the worker have to sail
with the ship? The Fifth Circuit in Endeavor Marine and Naquin relied 
primarily on a perils-of-the-sea test and concluded that because the
workers at issue faced the perils of the sea, they satisfied the nature
requirement. But in neither case did the court expressly state which perils
of the sea the workers faced, how they faced those perils, or for how long.
In Sanchez, the en banc Fifth Circuit attempted to give meaning to the
nature requirement in light of Papai and its own unsatisfactory and rather
conclusory post-Papai reliance on a broad perils-of-the-sea test to satisfy
that nature requirement. Let me now parse and discuss the test that Sanchez
articulated.
A. Exposure to the Perils of the Sea Is Relevant, but It Is Not Enough 
First, in overruling Naquin as well as disavowing the reasoning of
Endeavor Marine, the court eschewed sole or even primary reliance on a
perils-of-the-sea test to determine whether a putative seaman’s
employment-related connection to a vessel is substantial in nature:
“Simply asking whether the worker was subject to the ‘perils of the sea’ is
not enough to resolve the nature element.”162 I daresay that, properly 
framed and applied, a perils-of-the-sea test is exactly how to define the
nature requirement. I will explain later.163 
In any event, the Fifth Circuit in Sanchez rejected a pure perils-of-the-
sea nature test. But it did not totally jettison an analysis of perils of the sea 
in determining nature. Instead, it said that a perils-of-the-sea test was not
an “adequate test” and thus articulated its “additional inquiries.”164 The 
key word is additional. In perhaps the first case interpreting and applying
Sanchez—ironically, the case is [Victoria] Sanchez v. American Pollution
Control Corp.—Judge Barbier of the Eastern District of Louisiana, in
denying a motion for summary judgment that a worker was not a seaman,
noted that perils of the sea is still a factor although a “minor
consideration.”165 As support for the statement that exposure to the perils
of the sea is now a minor consideration, Judge Barbier noted that the en 
banc Sanchez decision pointed out, as Chandris had, that seaman status
and seaman’s risk are not co-extensive. In addition, while Judge Barbier
162. Id. at 574.
163. See infra text accompanying notes 208–213. 
164. Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 574 (en banc).
165. Sanchez v. Am. Pollution Control Corp., No. 12-CV-00164, 2021 WL
2368643 (E.D. La. June 4, 2021).
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272021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
did not expressly state this, the en banc Sanchez court did not analyze
whether Gilbert Sanchez was exposed to the perils of the sea when it
analyzed his work on both the WFD 350 and the E 263.166 
Let me conclude this portion of the discussion with a restatement of
the basic point: under the en banc Sanchez decision, an analysis of whether
a worker is exposed to the perils of the sea is still relevant in determining
whether the worker’s employment-related connection to a vessel is
substantial in nature, and I am not convinced that the relevance of exposure
to the perils of the sea is now a minor consideration, but it is clear that
now, in the Fifth Circuit, there must be more.
B. The Allegiance Inquiry
There are additional considerations, and the first one is whether the
worker owes “allegiance to the vessel, rather than simply to a shoreside
employer.”167 As noted, the allegiance inquiry seems to come from
language in Wilander and Chandris, but what does it mean? The en banc
Sanchez court did not expressly discuss the allegiance inquiry in its
analysis. One senses that the allegiance inquiry’s relationship to nature is
via a sort of subjective consideration of fealty or connection. To have a
relationship that is substantial in nature requires a serious connection to a
vessel or fleet of vessels. If we imagine a blue-water seaman who works
on one vessel owned by the worker’s employer, the relevance is clear. In
such a case the vessel and the employer are essentially one and allegiance
is owed to both. Since they are essentially one and the same, the question
answers itself. 
What about an employer who owns or controls multiple vessels? The
answer should not change. The employee can owe allegiance to the
employer as well as the vessels. Thus, in Meaux v. Cooper Consolidated,
L.L.C., plaintiff worked as a flagger and utility man and contributed to the
cargo-handling function of Cooper’s crane barges and to the barges’
mission of loading and unloading vessels moored midstream in the
Mississippi River.168 Meaux was assigned exclusively to defendant’s crane
barges, even when he was on board the vessels to be loaded and 
unloaded.169 Judge Ash had earlier ruled that Meaux was a seaman, but the
166. Perhaps that perils-of-the-sea analysis was unnecessary in the en banc
Sanchez opinion because the second panel opinion, in holding Sanchez was a
seaman, had implicitly held that he was exposed to the perils of the sea.
167. Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 574 (en banc).
168. Meaux v. Cooper Consol., L.L.C., No. 19-10628, 2021 WL 2635469
(E.D. La. June 25, 2021).
169. Id. at *1.
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  32 11/19/21  11:59 AM








     
   
       
   
 
    
  
   
   
   
 
 
     
      
 
     
   
  
 
   
     
   
  
 




   
    
   
   
   
 
 
      
      
  
28 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
defendant moved for reconsideration in light of Sanchez.170 Defendant
argued that Meaux owed his “allegiance to Cooper, a shoreside employer,
not to a vessel, because he reported to the job site at which Cooper needed
him, regardless of which crane barge may have been there.”171 In rejecting
that argument, the court said that Meaux owed allegiance to the crane
barges, an identifiable fleet of vessels under common ownership, “because
all his work was done in the service of those vessels as a member of their
crews assisting in their cargo-handling mission.”172 The fact that defendant
had shoreside facilities to which Meaux reported on his way to the barges
did “not negate the fact that Cooper was a vessel owner and Meaux worked
on its vessels.”173 
But what about the worker on a vessel whose employer is different
from the vessel owner?174 For instance, on a cruise ship, the spa staff
typically work for a shore-based company, not the cruise line. But they are
doing the work of the vessel—providing a vacation experience to cruisers.
And they may well have a relationship with the vessel or other vessels
owned and/or controlled by the same cruise line that is substantial in
duration. When one analyzes the nature of their work, one must ask the
allegiance question—to whom do they owe allegiance?—the shoreside
employer or the vessel? But how is the court supposed to make that
decision? Must the worker make a pledge? Take an oath? Submit to 
hypnotism? A lie detector test?
Happily, as Judge Barbier noted in Victoria Sanchez, the Chandris
allegiance language stated that a worker had to owe his allegiance to a 
vessel and “not solely” to a land-based employer.175 The en banc Sanchez
court provided that a worker had to owe his allegiance to a vessel “rather
than simply to a shoreside employer,” a slightly different wording than
Chandris.176 The “rather than simply” language means that a worker may 
owe allegiance to both a shoreside employer and a vessel on which they
work. Indeed, Victoria Sanchez was employed by American Pollution
Control Corp. (AMPOL) but worked on the NO GAS II, a shrimp boat that
was part of the Deepwater Horizon Vessels of Opportunity program under
170. Id.
171. Id. at *2.
172. Id. at *3.
173. Id.
174. Note that the way the question is asked contemplates a different entity
owning the vessel than the employer. This is a recurring fact pattern and also
seems to inform the third additional inquiry.
175. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 359 (1995).
176. Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Tex., L.L.C., 997 F.3d 566, 574 (5th Cir.
2021) (en banc).
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292021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
which local fishing vessels were engaged as part of the response.177 
Victoria Sanchez spent eleven to twelve hours per day on the vessel
deploying and retrieving boom.178 The court noted that while she no doubt
owed allegiance to her employer—who paid her—she also took orders
from the captain of the boat.179 The captain’s assistant taught her how to
do her job, and she helped to clean the vessel.180 “Thus, the current
evidence shows that [Victoria] Sanchez did not owe her allegiance ‘solely’
or ‘simply’ to AMPOL, indicating that her connection to the NO GAS II
was substantial in nature.”181 
So allegiance can be divided, and that is not fatal to a finding that the
worker’s connection to the vessel is substantial in nature. That said, does
the allegiance question really add much to the analysis, especially if
allegiance can be to multiple entities? It clearly makes sense that an
employee can owe allegiance to both an employer and a vessel, but that
basic reality undermines the importance of the inquiry. It is doubtful many
will be denied seaman status based on the allegiance inquiry. And finally,
allegiance seems more directly, logically, and quantifiably tied to the
duration requirement than to the nature requirement. The best way to
objectively measure allegiance would seem to be time spent with the
vessel or fleet of vessels, and that relates to duration not (or at least more 
than) nature.
C. The Sea-Based-Work or Seagoing-Activity Inquiry
Turning to the second additional inquiry: “[i]s the work sea-based or
[does it] involve seagoing activity?”182 Again, as noted, the inquiry derives
from Justice Kennedy’s Papai language about “going to sea” and
“seagoing activity.” To begin, the Fifth Circuit, like the Supreme Court,
used the word “sea,” but it once again bears emphasis that the court does
not mean “sea” as in “high seas.” This is both consistent with prior
jurisprudence and is obvious from the en banc opinion itself. In concluding
that the perils-of-the-sea test alone was inadequate to define the nature
requirement, the court said:
177. Sanchez v. Am. Pollution Control Corp., No. 12-CV-00164, 2021 WL
2368643 (E.D. La. June 4, 2021).
178. Id. at *1.
179. Id. at *7.
180. Id.
181. Id. 
182. Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Tex., L.L.C., 997 F.3d 566, 574 (5th Cir.
2021) (en banc).
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30 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Simply asking whether the worker was subject to the “perils of the
sea” is not enough to resolve the nature element. Consider the 
captain and crew of a ferry boat or of an inland tug working in a
calm river or bay, or the drilling crew on a drilling barge working
in a quiet canal. No one would question whether those workers are
seamen. Yet, their risk from the perils of the sea is minimal.183 
So clearly, Judge Davis believes that the brown-water seaman on a
calm river or bay or on a quiet canal is still a seaman. That has not changed.
While their work is not literally sea-based or seagoing, it is maritime based
and on the navigable waters of the United States. Thus, as Professor
Robertson pointed out and I noted above: the word “sea” in these opinions
really means “navigable waters.” One might even call them “maritime or
navigable-waters based,” rather than “sea-based,” although the phrase
lacks the literary flair of “sea-based.”184 
As I proceed, let me offer a word of caution about the sea-based-work 
inquiry. Lawyers and judges should be careful not to undermine the
Wilander decision when analyzing the nature requirement’s sea-based-
work inquiry. Wilander held that in order to be a seaman, a worker did not
have to aid in navigation; the worker merely needed to be doing the work
of the vessel.185 Courts must resist the temptation to import an aid-to-
navigation requirement through the back door of the sea-based-work 
inquiry. I can imagine a lawyer arguing that a cocktail server on a cruise
ship was not engaged in seagoing activity because serving drinks is not
seagoing activity. But the server is doing the work of the vessel. So the
sea-based-work or seagoing-activity nature inquiry should be whether the
worker is doing the work of the vessel in a sea-based or navigable-water-
based environment.
One important question that the court does not answer directly in
Sanchez is whether sea-based or seagoing activity requires motion. Must
the worker, to be engaged in sea-based work or seagoing activity, be
present when the vessel moves? That is, does being engaged in a sea-based
activity mean moving for 30% of a worker’s time on a vessel? Justice
Kennedy’s “going to sea” language would seem to require that the putative
seaman be present when the vessel actually moves. Sanchez is not so clear.
In analyzing the third additional nature inquiry—whether the task is
183. Id.
184. See also Gage v. Canal Barge, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 3d 754, 770 (M.D. La.
2020) (relying on Naquin and noting that “the perils of a maritime work
environment” or “maritime perils” may more accurately capture the nature
requirement than “perils of the sea”).
185. Id. at 576.
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312021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
discrete—the court, as quoted above, referred to two groups of workers on
drilling rigs.186 The first group—those who are seamen—“stay with the 
vessel when it moves from one drilling location to another.”187 Is it enough 
to stay assigned to the rig and follow it to its new location, or must the
worker actually be on board when it moves? That is, can the worker follow
it after it moves, or must the worker actually move with the vessel? It
would seem that the rig worker who is on the rig on the sea is engaged in
sea-based activity whether they are with the rig when it physically moves
or not. And even if the worker is on the rig when it moves, it would not be
for 30% of the worker’s employment term. They are subject to the perils
of the sea, including risks posed by other moving vessels.188 Of course, the
worker who is on the rig when it is jacked up two steps away from the
dock, like Gilbert Sanchez when he was working on the WFD 350, is not
engaged in sea-based activity.
The Meaux court considered an aspect of the motion issue. There, the
reader will recall, plaintiff worked on and from crane barges that were used
in the loading and unloading of vessels anchored midstream in the
Mississippi River.189 Defendant argued that Meaux’s work was not sea-
based but merely loading and unloading ships, i.e., longshoring.190 Judge
Ash noted that the issue was “close” but held that the work was indeed
sea-based.191 He wrote:
What is different here is that Meaux performed this work on or
from a crane barge alongside cargo vessels moored or anchored
midstream in the Mississippi River. Neither the barges nor the
cargo vessels were dockside merely a gangplank from shore.
Rather Meaux had to take a crew boat or, as he did on at least one 
occasion, ride the crane barge to the location of the cargo vessels
being loaded or unloaded. This Court thinks this separation from
the safety of land, even if not all that far, taken together with the
fact that all of Meaux’s work was performed aboard vessels 
midstream in a dangerous river, is enough of a distinction to make
Meaux’s work a sea-based activity. Indeed, the midstream
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. The risks other moving vessels pose may be greater for a worker on a rig
than a fixed platform, but that is a technical, factual question upon which I will
not opine.
189. Meaux v. Cooper Consol., L.L.C., No. 19-10628, 2021 WL 2635469, at
*3 (E.D. La. June 25, 2021).
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
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32 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
location of Meaux’s work makes this case distinguishable from
Naquin and Endeavor Marine where the plaintiffs’ work was
performed on or near the dock. . . . Here, Meaux’s work was never
performed on or near a dock but was done entirely from vessels
moored or anchored midstream.192 
Clearly, the risks posed by other vessels in navigation are greater mid-
stream than they are at the dock, and Judge Ash seems to recognize that
fact. Meaux was more than a step or two away from the dock. Someone
doing work on vessels mid-stream in the Mississippi is exposed to the
perils of the sea from unintended motion and from other vessels to a
greater extent than one doing the same work on a dock or on a vessel
moored to a dock. Critically, Gilbert Sanchez was no more exposed to the
perils of the sea when he was on the WFD 350 than any other worker on a
dock. Meaux was in a much different position. 
D. The Discrete-Task Inquiry
The third additional inquiry asks: “(a) Is the worker’s assignment to a
vessel limited to performance of a discrete task after which the worker’s 
connection to the vessel ends, or (b) Does the worker’s assignment include
sailing with the vessel from port to port or location to location?”193 The 
third additional inquiry comes from Papai and, arguably, Chandris, where 
the worker at issue was performing a discrete assignment on a transient
basis. Here again, the Sanchez court seems to be getting at the connection
to the relevant vessel. Is the worker truly a part of the crew of that vessel,
or is the worker on the vessel to perform discrete repairs? Is it
contemplated that the worker will stay with the vessel after the repairs are
complete?
One will recall that Sanchez’s work on the E 263 was on the OCS, 
arguably satisfying the sea-based-work second additional inquiry
requirement. He even travelled with the rig, a vessel, if that was necessary.
But it was not contemplated that he would remain on the rig after the
repairs were complete. He would move on. 
Let me return to Judge Davis’s paragraph about the two groups of rig
workers, which I quoted in full earlier and, in part, several paragraphs ago.
The second group of rig workers are not seamen.
The second group are specialized transient workers, usually
192. Id.
193. Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Tex., L.L.C., 997 F.3d 566, 574 (5th Cir. 
2021) (en banc).
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332021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
employed by contractors. These workers are engaged to do
specific discrete short-term jobs. Discrete transient jobs are like
the work done by longshoremen when a vessel calls in port. As
stated in Papai, these workers have only a “transitory or sporadic”
connection to a vessel or group of vessels and do not qualify for
seaman status. Sanchez, as a transitory worker, falls into the
second group, and thus does not satisfy the nature test.194 
This second group are not, in conception, sufficiently related to the
vessel. They do discrete jobs on a short-term basis and move on.195 Their
connection to the vessel is transitory. There is one very interesting clause
in the first line quoted above: “usually employed by contractors.”196 
Certainly, that was the case with Gilbert Sanchez, but what does it mean?
The spa employee on the cruise ship is employed by a contractor, but we
have not questioned his or her seaman status.
Let us consider a number of hypotheticals to see how this third 
additional inquiry might play out in practice. Let us begin with a worker,
Roddy Roustabout, who is hired by PumpAlot, Inc., which immediately 
assigned Roustabout to a rig it owned on the OCS. Roustabout goes out to
the rig and works there over a three-month period—ten days on, ten days
off—and then Roustabout is injured on the rig. The rig never moved the
entire time that Roustabout was on the rig. PumpAlot attests that there was
no anticipation Roustabout’s assignment would change and that if the rig 
moved, Roustabout would move with the rig, even though that never
happened. Is Roustabout in the court’s first group even though Roustabout
never moved with the vessel? I think the answer should be yes. There is 
nothing sporadic about the connection to the rig. It is not transient; it is
happenstance that the rig was not moved before the worker suffered injury.
What about a hairdresser, Terry Perry, who is an employee of Beauty
Loves Travel (BLT). BLT contracts with Renaissance Cruise Line (RCL)
to provide hairdressers on RCL cruise ships. Perry works on three different
194. Id. at 576.
195. In Meaux, the court found that the worker’s tasks were not discrete. Judge
Ash said:
The entirety of Meaux’s work for the Cooper crane barges, whether as a
flagger or utility man, entailed assisting the barges in their cargo-
handling operations. Meaux was not a specialized transient worker
engaged to do specific discrete short-term jobs. Instead, he worked full-
time on or from the crane barges to which he was assigned helping them
to load and unload cargo vessels moored or anchored in the river.
Meaux, 2021 WL 2635469, at *3.
196. Id.
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34 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
RCL cruises over the course of Perry’s employment, spending more than
30% of the total BLT employment time on RCL ships. Perry is injured on
Perry’s third cruise with RCL and claims seaman status. The evidence is
that there was not necessarily any expectation that Perry would return to a
particular RCL ship but every expectation she would be assigned to some
RCL cruise ship. How does Perry fare under the third additional inquiry?
I would argue that while there may not have been any clear expectation
Perry would return to any one RCL ship, so she did not move with any one
ship as the first group of Judge Davis’s rig workers do, there was every
expectation she would return to the fleet, and thus she moved with a fleet
that is under common ownership and control. 
Now, let us change the facts ever so slightly. Assume Big Oil (BO)
has a number of rigs in the Gulf. Big Oil hires Great Repairs (GR) to do
maintenance work on the rigs. GR workers are assigned to BO rigs as
needed, but GR workers only work on BO rigs. GR workers are sent out
to do particular jobs, but all of the jobs are for BO. Lynn Lyle, a GR
welder, is injured on a BO rig. Is Lyle in Judge Davis’s first group or the
second group? Lyle works for another employer. His jobs are discrete, but
they are all for BO. But Lyle’s connection to BO rigs seems substantial. If
BO hired its own repair people and Lyle worked for BO, would that
change it?197 If the anticipation is that Lyle would continue to work on BO
rigs, even if employed by GR, I think Lyle may belong in the first group.
And recall that in Chandris, Justice O’Connor distinguished a crew
member from a land-based employee who happened to be on a vessel at a
given time.198 
Was Gilbert Sanchez that different from Lyle? He worked for
SmartFab but spent 61 of his 67 days of employment on Enterprise rigs.
Yet Judge Davis stated that his employment on the E 263 was a discrete
individual job, and once the work was done, he would have no more
connection with the vessel.199 And, of course, Sanchez’s work on the WFD
350 was not sea-based because the rig was moored next to the dock the
entire time he worked on it. One wonders if the results would be different
if Sanchez had only worked on the E 263 and proved that it was expected 
he would continue to work on Enterprise rigs on the OCS. And would it
have been different if he had been able to prove that he spent more than
30% of his time in the past on Enterprise rigs on the OCS?
197. The facts were analogous in Chandris. He was a marine engineer, but he
was not assigned to any one vessel, and he was on one of his employer’s vessel 
for a particular purpose related to anticipated vessel repairs. Chandris, Inc. v.
Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1995).
198. Id. at 370.
199. Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 576 (en banc).
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352021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
Finally, as it relates to the third additional inquiry—the discrete-job 
analysis—it seems to overlap with the durational requirement, much as the
allegiance inquiry does. Is a connection to a vessel substantial or is it
discrete? Isn’t that a question of the durational connection? If a worker
spends over 30% of her employment on a vessel or fleet of vessels under
common ownership or control, then she can satisfy the Chandris duration
requirement. But per the en banc Sanchez analysis, even a worker
potentially satisfying the Chandris duration test may find their connection
to the vessel discrete and therefore not substantial in nature. Who knows?
Perhaps Adam would have liked another bite at the apple as well, but he
was already gone. 
E. Multi-Factor or Elemental
One last analytical question about the en banc Sanchez additional
inquiries: do they contemplate a multi-factor test, or must a putative
seaman clear all four hurdles or elements for their employment connection
to a vessel to be substantial in nature? Judge Barbier in Victoria Sanchez
noted that the Fifth Circuit did not supply an answer to that question and
thus analyzed all four inquiries, finding each sufficiently present to raise a
factual question for trial concerning the nature of Victoria Sanchez’s 
connection to the relevant vessel.200 Judge Ash also analyzed all four in 
Meaux.201 
Notably, the en banc Sanchez court did not expressly articulate or
apply all four inquiries when analyzing Gilbert Sanchez’s relationships to
the WFD 350 and the E 263. In fact, it seems the court found that the
failure to satisfy one inquiry—the seagoing nature of the work—was fatal
to Sanchez’s seaman claims vis-à-vis the WFD 350. And the failure to
satisfy another of the inquiries—the non-discrete nature of the
assignment—vis-à-vis the E 263 was fatal. Thus, if the failure to satisfy 
only one of the inquiries is fatal to satisfying the nature requirement, then
perhaps all four inquiries must be satisfactorily answered to establish
nature. If the inquiries establish a multi-factor test, one would have
expected the court to analyze all four inquiries regarding Gilbert Sanchez’s
employment. 
200. Sanchez v. Am. Pollution Control Corp., No. 12-CV-00164, 2021 WL
2368643, at *8 (E.D. La. June 4, 2021).
201. Meaux, 2021 WL 2635469.
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VII. ADDITIONAL REFLECTIONS ON SANCHEZ
The en banc Sanchez decision rearticulating the Fifth Circuit’s test for
determining whether a putative seaman’s employment-related connection
to a vessel is substantial in nature is arguably the most significant of that
court’s seaman-status decisions since Robison. The unanimous opinion
reflects a noble effort to bring Fifth Circuit jurisprudence in line with
Supreme Court seaman-status jurisprudence, especially perhaps the “take
him to sea” and “seagoing activity” language in Papai. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court’s language was rather vague and confusing, and efforts to
make sense of it, as lower courts must do, will undoubtedly lead to more
confusion. That is what the en banc Sanchez decision may well do. Time
will tell. Undoubtedly, the opinion will cause litigation concerning the
meaning and application of the four inquiries. As noted, that has already
begun.202 Change is in the air, but before I discuss that change further, let
me note what has not changed.
Despite all the talk about going to sea, sea-based work, and seagoing
activity, the status of many brown-water seamen will not change. This is
clear from Judge Davis’s statement that no one questions that “the captain
and crew of a ferry boat or of an inland tug working in a calm river or bay,
or the drilling crew on a drilling barge working on a quiet canal” are
seamen.203 And it is apparent that those who serve on the crews of jack-up 
rigs and other multi-purpose vessels are seamen under Sanchez. They are 
in that first group of workers Judge Davis referred to when discussing the
third additional inquiry, discreteness. These workers who “stay with the
vessel when it moves from one drilling location to another . . . are the
members of the crew of the vessel and are seamen.”204 The real target of
Sanchez’s additional inquiries are the second group of workers on drilling
rigs: “transient workers, usually employed by contractors[,] . . . engaged
to do specific discrete short-term jobs . . . [who] have only a ‘transitory or
sporadic’ connection to a vessel . . . and do not qualify for seaman
status.”205 But the language and application may go beyond the target.
William Tell’s son was luckier.
The en banc Sanchez court took a single inquiry regarding the nature
of the employment—whether the worker is sufficiently exposed to the 
perils of the sea—and turned it into four inquiries. That will necessarily
make life more complex. As noted in the previous section, the court
202. See, e.g., Sanchez, 2021 WL 2368643; Meaux, 2021 WL 2635469.
203. Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 574 (en banc).
204. Id. at 576.
205. Id.
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372021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
derived its three additional inquiries from language in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 
But two of the inquiries—allegiance and the discrete-assignment
inquiry—overlap with the durational requirement. The most quantifiable
objective manifestation of allegiance is time; that is one of the reasons we
celebrate lengthy anniversaries for birthdays, marriage, employment, etc. 
Additionally, time on an assignment or with a vessel is the most objective 
way to decide if an assignment is discrete and transient or ongoing. Time
is the key to the durational requirement. The overlap of the two nature
questions with the durational requirement befogs; it does not clarify. The
inquiries are relevant, but to me they are relevant to the durational
requirement, not nature.
Moreover, the allegiance inquiry does not promise to have much
decisional weight. In single-employer cases, it is essentially irrelevant. In
two-employer cases it promises to add little. Either the worker will have
dual allegiance to the shore-based employer and to the vessel, as in
Victoria Sanchez, or the discreteness question will be decisive because a
decision that a particular employment assignment is transient or sporadic
will answer the allegiance question as well.
The second additional inquiry concerning whether the work is sea-
based or involves seagoing activity may also prove troublesome. First, to
reiterate what I said above: the inquiry should not undermine Wilander’s
holding that a worker does not have to aid in navigation to attain seaman
status as long as the worker is doing the work of the vessel. Moving on,
we know the worker must then be doing the work of the vessel on
navigable water. What more? It is unclear. Certainly, it seems in order to
satisfy the nature element, the worker—even on a rig—must be away from
the dock for a significant period—30%. Recall that Gilbert Sanchez’s
work on the WFD 350 was only a step or two from the dock, and the court
said that did not involve seagoing activity. We may infer that the work on
the E 263 was sea-based because, as the court said, “it was located on the
OCS.”206 And I am confident that if the work were not sea-based, the court
would have said so as it did with Sanchez’s work on the WFD 350. I am
also struck that the sea-based or seagoing-activity inquiry does have
substantive content that goes beyond the geographical. It is the relationship
of sea-based work and seagoing activities to the risks that work poses— 
risks associated with the perils of the sea.
Thus, let me circle back around and recall what the Court counseled
in Chandris: “[W]e think it preferable to focus upon the essence of what
it means to be a seaman and to eschew the temptation to create detailed
206. Id. 
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38 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
tests to effectuate the congressional purpose, tests that tend to become ends
in and of themselves.”207 
I fear that the en banc Sanchez court may not have eschewed the
temptation and has created a more detailed test for nature than is necessary.
Focusing on exposure to the perils of the sea focuses on the “essence of
what it means to be a seaman.”208 Indeed two sentences after the above
quoted language, the Chandris Court noted the special hazards that seamen
face—i.e., the perils of the sea. 
Of course, the Sanchez court said that relying solely on an analysis of
whether or not the putative seaman was exposed to the perils of the sea to
determine the nature of the employment was “not enough”;209 it was “not
adequate.”210 But, why not? There seem to be two reasons. First because
seamen and non-seamen may face similar perils.211 Yes, but the non-
seaman would not satisfy either the doing-the-work-of-the-vessel or the
duration requirements. Being exposed to the perils of the sea is not enough
in and of itself to make one a seaman. The second reason the court
jettisoned a pure perils-of-the-sea test returns us to the ferry boat or tug on
a calm river or bay or the drilling crew in a quiet canal. Judge Davis stated
that they are seamen even though “their risk from the perils of the sea is
minimal.”212 Minimal may understate it, but clearly the hypothetical
workers on calm inland waters do not face the perils of the sea in the same
way as the worker on the high or open seas far from home. But the inland
waterway workers do face the perils of a maritime working environment
including the motion of vessels.213 Working on a vessel away from a dock
207. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 369 (1995).
208. Id. at 347, 369.




213. The court also said that some commentators were critical of its nature 
jurisprudence. In Sanchez, it said, “Much of the scholarship addressing seaman
status emphasizes that ‘perils of the sea’ alone is a problematic test for making
the land-based and sea-based distinction.” Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 573 n.63 (en
banc). See, e.g., Matthew H. Frederick, Adrift in the Harbor: Ambiguous-
Amphibious Controversies and Seamen’s Access to Workers’ Compensation
Benefits, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1704 (2003). One can read that article as more
critical of the court’s failure to articulate the relevant perils of the sea. Likewise,
Timothy M. O’Hara, Comment, Naquin v. Elevating Boats, LLC: The Fifth
Circuit’s Improper Expansion of Jones Act “Seaman Status” Qualification, 36 
PACE L. REV. 263, 286 (2015), also cited by the court, proposes retaining a
meaningful role for the perils-of-the-sea test. Sanchez, 997 F.3d 568 n.12 (en
banc). See also L. Taylor Coley, The “Perils of the Sea”—Man Status Question:
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392021] THE “NATURE” OF SEAMAN STATUS AFTER SANCHEZ
increases the perils of the sea posed by motion on water either by the vessel
on which work is occurring or from other vessels nearby.
As I have indicated, I believe that exposure to the perils of the sea for
30% or more of one’s employment should satisfy the nature requirement.
But I also believe that courts must examine and rearticulate what those
perils are and then determine whether the relevant worker is subject to
them. Those perils have changed since Dana wrote Two Years Before the
Mast214 and Melville penned Moby Dick.215 Courts should undertake a 
twenty-first century reexamination of today’s perils of the sea, articulate
them, and apply them. I imagine many will be similar to the historic perils: 
storms, isolation, distance from sophisticated medical care, risks posed by
the motion of vessels, and more. But is it riskier to be on a rig than a
platform? What about the dangers of capping a well while preparing to
move to the next assignment? Are there heightened risks of chemical
exposure and accompanying damage when ships are carrying dangerous
chemical cargos and workers are so close to them? Answers will depend
on the testimony of maritime engineers, medical professionals, and
scientists. But it is time for that discussion to occur. It is certainly riskier
to be away from a dock than to be connected to it as Gilbert Sanchez was
on the WFD 350.
I daresay that the perceived problem was not so much with the perils-
of-the-sea test but its application. The courts in both Endeavor Marine and
Naquin articulated the perils-of-the-sea test but never applied it. The courts
did not say which perils of the sea the workers were exposed to or why or
for how long. Quite simply, without that analysis, one cannot say the 
workers were exposed to the perils of the sea.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court’s requirement that in order to be a
seaman a worker must have an employment-related connection to a vessel
or fleet of vessels under common ownership and control that is substantial
in both duration and nature is clear. What has been less clear is what the
nature requirement means. Justice Kennedy in Papai indicated that a
substantial connection in nature meant “going to sea.” The United States
Fifth Circuit has not interpreted the phrase literally, and that is wise given
the many seamen who ply inland on brown water, rather than the deep blue
The Fifth Circuit Falls Behind FELA’s Advancements in Remedies in Favor of the
Continued Confusion Surrounding the Seaman Definition, 39 TUL. MAR. L. J.
371, 380–81 (2014) (contending Naquin was not exposed to the perils of the sea).
214. RICHARD HENRY DANA, JR., TWO YEARS BEFORE THE MAST (1840).
215. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK (1851).
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sea. But nature still means something. I propose that it means being
exposed to the perils of the sea, critically including, as per the late
Professor David Robertson, being exposed to the risks generated by other
vessels, while on a vessel. Thus, in order to be a seaman—to have an
employment-related connection to a vessel that is substantial in nature—a 
worker must be exposed to the perils of the sea away from the dock for
30% or more of the worker’s employment with the relevant employer. The
30% requirement is consistent with the applicable rule for determining if
a worker’s connection to a vessel or group of vessels under common
ownership and control is substantial in duration.
The Fifth Circuit en banc in Sanchez jettisoned the perils-of-the-sea
test as the sole or primary determinant of nature. Instead, it articulated
three additional inquiries derived from language in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence. The additional inquiries promise to add confusion. Two of
them clearly overlap with the durational requirement, and one of them has
the potential to undermine the holding in Wilander. 
Should the United States Supreme Court decide to consider the nature
requirement again—and perhaps it should soon do so—it should not add
additional inquiries to the nature question other than asking whether the
worker is sufficiently exposed to the perils of the sea. Rather, it should
clearly state that courts and litigants must articulate the relevant perils of
the sea to which the putative seaman is allegedly exposed, explain why
those alleged perils are relevant, and explain why exposure to them
satisfies the nature requirement.
